SN
563 233 depends on his herds: they are his only resource, his only wealth, and his only pride. When two nomads meet, whether [521] they are Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, or Tibetans, the first subject that comes up is their cattle. Among nomads, social [554] [422] status is established by the possession of horses, camels, and livestock in general, and only secondarily determined by titles or descent. This is especially true for the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Tibetans, and to a lesser degree for the Mongols, among whom aristocratic birth (real or imagined) SN plays an important role.

[342] [352] [353] The average nomad's life can be described as follows: he lives in a roomy felt tent, furnished with house altar, in the case of Buddhists, or with an artistically made book-stand for the Quran in the case of Muslims, and some chests and carpets. The whole family takes care of the livestock, and periodically the migration unit moves during the summer time SN from pasture to pasture, preserving the richest and most [621] protected grazing land for the winter time. The weather plays a fatal role in the welfare of the nomad's livestock, and every so often a migration unit (the ail, the aul, the ayir, SN the omoq, otoq, xotn, or uruq, the ulus or even the aimaq) [614] loses its livestock. In this case, those clans which still own [426] enough livestock divide their herds and lend part of them to those who suffered the loss. Collective cooperation is exer- [476] cised in this respect by Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Mongols, while the nomadic Tibetans, in a similar situation, have quite SN a reputation for robbing neighboring tribes of their livestock.

563 771 The nomadic way of life, the close contact with nature and dependence on nature promotes animism, shamanism, and spiritualism, which goes hand in hand with the prevailing religions of Islam (in the case of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Salars, and some Tibetan clans) and Buddhism (in the case of the Mongols, Tibetans, and Sarigh-Uighurs). As a general rule, the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh are not very fanatic or ardent Muslims, and neither are the Mongols very pious Buddhists, but still, both SN feel strongly about their religious although they are rather lax in their observance. No matter how poor a Buddhistic nomad [792] is, he voluntarily supports and feeds wandering [illegible]nas, [794] invites several on major occasions (birth, death and marriage if the bride's father can afford it), pays them, and finally is accustomed to the old tradition ot giving a small percentage of his livestock every year to Buddhistic monasteries. All nomads are very superstitious, and the relationship between cause and effect is often misinterpreted, e.g., in the case of disease or weather. It is safe to say that the dominant motives of the nomads are economic in the first place and religious in the second place.

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V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century. Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

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As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirghiz, Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

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Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

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There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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Table 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE PEASANTS IN THE NORTHWEST UP TO DECEMBER, 1953
(Based on Communist statistics)

	Total Population (1953 census)	Organized Farming Households		Mutual Aid Teams	Permanent Mutual Aid Teams		Agricultural Producers Cooperatives	State Farms
		Number	Percentage of total farming households		Number	Percentage of Total No. of Teams		
Northwest China	35,358,000	2,800,000	45 %				305	
Shensi	15,881,000	1,424,800	47 %	280,848	34,381	12.2%	234	93
Kansu (including Ninghsia)	12,929,000		45 %	194,400	19,400	10 %	32	50
Ninghsia (721,000)			53 %	13,615	2,535	16 %	19	-
Chinghai	1,677,000	96,000	52.3%	25,106	1,840	7.3%	10	-
Sinkiang	4,874,000	299,000	33.8%	51,600	(2,500)	5 %	10	-

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*175 leadership to mutual aid and cooperative organs in some places,
*668 a number of mutual aid teams ceased to exist. In Han-ch'eng
474 and Ho-yang, in Shensi, 20-30 per cent of such teams were sus-
[476] pended." As to agricultural cooperatives, the number increased from 1,970 or 1.32 per cent of the farming households in November 1954, to 17,000 or 16,83 per cent of the population by summer of last year. Plans are to increase the number fo 35,000 by 1957 to embrace 55 per cent of the households. However, by summer of last year (1955) too, the number of handicraft and supply and marketing cooperatives in Shensi embraced 13.64 per cent of the agricultural workers, and the 5416 credit cooperatives had a membership of 1,400,000 households, which was 45 per cent of the total farming households.

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[476] Kansu: in this province, where it was claimed that 57 per cent of the peasant population was organized, the number of mutual aid teams dropped from 245,300 in the spring of 1954 to 212,000 in 1955 and only a third of these was permanent. Due to "rightist ideology" of the cadres, the number of agricultural producers cooperatives also dropped from 7,419 in the fall of 1954 to 7,151 in spring of 1955. However, this was quickly rectified and by the end of the year, there were 16,849, embracing 23.43 per cent of the rural households and plans are to have 47,400 by 1957 to comprise 60 per cent of the households.

Chinghai: The 575 agricultural producers cooperatives at the beginning of 1955 embraced 80,000 households or 50 per cent of the peasant population. Sixty-seven per cent of the rural population was organized. (67.93 per cent)

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175 Sinkiang: Only five per cent of the 58,773 mutual aid teams in the
178 summer of 1954 were permanent. The number was increased to
474 75,275 embracing 63.32 per cent of the farming population, with
476 28.33 per cent of the teams permanent. The number of agricultural producers cooperatives rose to 1,702 by fall of 1955, but they occupied only five per cent of the cultivated area and their 47,328 households came to only 5.3 per cent of the farming population. The plans for 1957 are for 11,216 cooperatives to include 41 per cent of the households.

Only in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District was the collectivization more satisfactory. In the summer of 1955, there were 6,200 mutual aid teams and 243 cooperatives embracing 65 per cent of the farmers. The political organization of the rural population in Sinkiang was also behind the other provinces. According to Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 45,62 per cent of the farmers were organized in spring of 1955. (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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Table 6. CADRES ASIGNED TO AND TRAINED FOR COOPERATIVE WORK

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	Total No. of Cadres	Number of Native Cadres	Cadres Assigned to Cooperatives	Cadres to be trained for cooperative work
Shensi			20,000	200,000
Chinghai	8,500	3,400	3,100	7,300
Sinkiang	51,000	34,400	27,000	
Kansu (no figures available)				

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668 ning in agriculture has become more complex and difficulties are encountered in realizing annual targets. The absence of trained technicians to introduce new farming techniques, the lack of accountants and organizers in the cooperatives, and the so-called ideological backwardness of many of the Communist cadres themselves have prevented rapid cooperativization. We will now examine very briefly the progress achieved in the different regions of the Northwest and the problems which have arisen to prevent agricultural development. In this way, the pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural planning can be observed more clearly. Henceforth, all statistics concerning the number of co-ops, agricultural output, etc., are Communist claims and, of course, must be carefully considered.

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B. Application of Communist Agricultural Policy to the Northwest

1. Sinkiang

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668 By June, 1955, nearly six years after the area was occupied by the Communist Army, there were 75,215 mutual aid teams (it is not known how many of these were on a permanent basis) and the agricultural producer cooperative numbered 1,702 with roughly 66.4 per cent of the peasant population participating in some form of co-op. By the end of 1956, in response to Mao's directive to hasten the creation of agricultural producer cooperatives, it is planned to increase their number to 5,100 and by 1957 to 10,240. (Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1, 1955, pp. 686-87.)

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[474] Emphasis has been on raising the production of wheat, oil seed bearing plants, and cotton, by extending cultivation. The Communists attribute all increases in production to a result of further consolidation and development of the cooperative movement. Although there is a paucity of data on output, acreage, and output per acre, the following table has been pieced together from the information available, in an attempt to give some comparisons of increases attained during the Communist period with that of 1949. The figures for the Communist period have been obtained from 1954 and 1955 reports. See Table 1.

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175 The government has established agricultural stations, in order to show the peasants of various nationalities how to improve their farming methods. In 1955 it was reported that Sinkiang had seventy such stations. Two tractor stations have also been opened in Urumchi and Sui-ting. These stations have sought to improve production by planting Ukrainian winter wheat and S-3173 cotton, and promote better procedures of farming such as summer ploughing, autumn ploughing, winter irrigation, sowing in rows, close-planting, and cotton-pruning. They have made efforts to wipe out insect pests. The Soviet Union sent